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ABSTRACT: 
 
A key part of corporate governance reforms in Australia, as represented by CLERP 9, 
addresses concerns over the audit function and the role of independent auditors in 
monitoring managers and providing useful information to stakeholders about the financial 
position of the company.  In comparing the regulatory responses to auditor independence 
dilemmas, there have been claims that CLERP 9 is less ‘stringent’ than the reforms 
imposed by the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the US. This paper looks at three particular 
situations that have been the subject of recent reform to strengthen independence: the 
mandatory rotation of auditors, recruitment of former auditors as board members, and 
provision of non-audit services to clients. In each case, we compare the similarities and 
differences of the regulatory response between Australia and US, to distil the efficacy of 
the CLERP 9 approach.  
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Regulatory responses to auditor independence dilemmas – who 
takes the stronger line? 
 
1.0 Introduction 
 
Financial statement audits are seen as an integral part of the corporate governance 
landscape. Although this statement is a ‘given’, it is reflected in the Ramsay report1 and 
the ASX Principles of Good Corporate Governance, principle 4: Safeguard integrity in 
financial reporting, which requires listed companies to  
“Have a structure to independently verify and safeguard the integrity of the 
company's financial reporting. 
This requires the company to put in place a structure of review and authorisation 
designed to ensure the truthful and factual presentation of the company’s financial 
position. The structure would include, for example: 
• review and consideration of the accounts by the audit committee 
• a process to ensure the independence and competence of the company’s external 
auditors.” 
 
As highlighted in the ASX principles, a fundamental tenet of the audit is that is conducted 
by an external auditor who is competent and independent. However, in performing their 
professional function, an auditor is clearly subject to countervailing pressures, for 
example, simply in maintaining their relationship with their current client. The auditor is 
paid a professional fee for the service, and does not want to be in a position to jeopardise 
future fees in relation to the audit service or indeed other professional services the audit 
firm can offer the client. 
 
Formal government inquiries including the US Senate Commerce Committee 2002  and 
HIH Royal Commission Report 2003 and the Ramsay Report  in Australia were a result 
                                                 
1 Ian Ramsay. Independence of Australian Company Auditors: Review of Current Australian Requirements 
and Proposals for Reform, Report to the Minister for Financial Services and Regulation, 2001. At 
paragraph 4.01 “Audited financial statements are an important part of the financial information that is 
available to the capital markets and an important part of effective corporate governance”.  
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of investigations into the reasons behind particular corporate collapses in the respective 
jurisdictions.2  Overall, the reports referred to the quality of financial reporting and the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms as being unsatisfactory.3 The 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 in the US (“SarbOx”) and the Corporate Law Economic 
Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004 (“CLERP 9) were 
the respective legislative responses, aimed at ‘rebuilding’ the integrity in audit by 
emphasising independence. 
While both Acts cover several different aspects of the audit function and independence to 
restore confidence, the main focus of this paper is to examine specific reforms and 
provide comparative analysis on the approach to independence. Whilst commentators in 
Australia have made wide ranging comparisons between CLERP 9 and SarbOx,4 our 
approach is to target specific threats to independence and examine the regulatory 
response.    
There is a generally held perception that the CLERP 9 reforms are less stringent than the 
SarbOx reforms in the US.5 This has been attributed to the differing impetus – SarbOx is 
a direct response to economic events, whereas Australia’s reform, whilst in a backdrop of 
supervening events, was in the context of an ongoing reform agenda under the auspices 
of the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program.6 This reform agenda commenced in 
Australia in an auditing context as far back as the 1997 report of the Ministerial Council 
for Corporations on auditor independence and discipline.7
                                                 
2 Although the Ramsay Report was commissioned in this context, it is accurate to point out that its terms of 
reference did not relate to specific events. 
3 B.O’Connell, L.Webb & H Schwarzbach, ‘Batten down the hatches! US Accounting Standards and 
lessons for Australia’ (2005) 15 Australian Accounting Review 52. 
4 Notably but not limited to P.von Nessen, ‘Corporate governance in Australia: Converging with 
international developments’ (2003) 15 Australian Journal of Corporate Law  1;  J.Hill, ‘Regulatory 
Responses to Global Corporate Scandals’ (2005) 23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 367. 
5 Notably media commentary, for example, S Oldfield, ‘ASX warns brokers on independence’ The 
Australian Financial Review 16/6/2004. 
6 O’Connell, op cit n 3. 
7 MINCO Working Party of the Ministerial Council for Corporations recommended in its Report on Review 
of Requirements for the Registration and Regulation of Company Auditors, 1997. (Referred to an MINCO) 
http://www.treasury.gov.au/documents/294/PDF/compaud.pdf accessed 17 Jan 2007. 
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Both jurisdictions however adopt a prescriptive approach to governance, audit 
responsibility and disclosure. Rather than execute a comparative overview, the purpose of 
this paper is to assess the relative strengths of the audit independence reforms. One 
reason this comparison is of interest is that it assists researchers in empirical studies to 
determine the effectiveness of the reforms. The primary criticism of regulatory impost is 
the cost; in this context, specifically the effect on audit fees and the market for audit 
services. There is growing interest in designing studies to measure the costs to audit 
clients of implementing the reforms, and the cross jurisdictional comparison allows for 
parity.  
Accordingly, the paper defines audit independence and sets the background for the 
CLERP 9 reforms. Next, in section 3, the paper examines three indirect reforms as 
examples to compare the regulatory approaches between Australia and the US. In 
particular, the major criticism of prescriptive rules relates to the costs imposed on market 
participants. In this section, we also examine some of the empirical literature relating to 
the cost of audits (audit fees) and speculate upon the CLERP 9 effects. Finally, in section 
4, we make some conclusions from our comparison. 
The difference between ‘direct’ independence reforms and ‘indirect’ independence 
reforms are described in Figure 1. The direct reforms, which are not compared in detail in 
this paper, refers to the prescriptive rules relating to conflict of interest situations and 
conflicts. Other reforms relating to auditors, are referred to as indirect reforms, and we 
have selected three rules for comparison: 
1. auditor rotation 
2. auditor recruitment to the client firm pos audit engagement  
3. the extent of the audit firm’s ability to earn non-audit fees. 
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Figure 1 
 
Reforms to  
Audit independence 
Direct reforms Indirect reforms 
Prohibition on conflict of interest situations 
Prohibition on conflict of interest relationships 
Auditor rotation 
Auditor recruitment to 
audit client 
Non-audit fees 
 
The indirect reforms are analysed in section 3. before we turn to that analysis, we first 
discuss the importance and definition of audit independence. 
2.0 Auditor independence and the CLERP 9 agenda 
2.1 Independence 
Independence is generally understood to refer to a mental state of objectivity and lack of 
bias. Independence ‘requires a freedom from bias, personal interest, prior commitment to 
an interest, or susceptibility to undue influence or pressure.’8 Independence is crucial in 
the auditing profession. ‘If the audit opinion is to provide the desired degree of assurance, 
the auditor must be able to form and express an opinion without bias.’9 Without it, the 
auditor’s opinion is not credible and adds little value.10 It is argued that if an auditor is 
                                                 
8 Australian Statement of Auditing Practice AUP 32 Audit Independence para 8. 
pendence’ (1997) Sloan 
ndependence, low balling and disclosure regulation’ (1981) 3(2) Journal of 
9 M.Bazerman, Morgan K and Loewenstein G, ‘The Impossibility of Auditor Inde
Management Review 91. 
10 L.DeAngelo, ‘Auditor I
Accounting and Economics 113. 
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not independent, the financial statements will be less credible. This would result in an 
increase of the risk and cost of capital of the firm. 11
 
Audit independence has two facets- actual and perceived independence.12 Actual 
independence requires the auditor to exercise scepticism and act with integrity, 
objectivity. It means that the opinion formed does not compromise professional 
judgment. To ensure independence is more apparent, APES Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants identifies guidelines for maintaining independence in 
appearances. In general, it means avoiding facts and circumstances that are so significant 
where a reasonable person would conclude that the auditor’s integrity and objectivity 
have been compromised.13   
2.2 Institutional arrangements 
It is difficult to capture all the CLERP 9 reforms and attribute them as ‘audit 
independence’ reforms, as the legislation operates as a package that has indirect impacts 
as well.  The CLERP 9 ‘independence’ reforms tend to focus on the direct requirements, 
such as s307C(1) that requires the auditor to make a written declaration that there have 
been no contraventions of the independence requirements in the Act or the applicable 
code of conduct (now known as APES110 – see below).  The independence requirements 
of the Act as referred to in s307C(1) relate to Part 2M.4 Div 3 Auditor Independence.  
 
The classification of ‘independence’ in Div 3 commences with s324CA and relies on 
equating independence with conflict of interests. Division 3 creates two subsets of 
conflicts: 
                                                 
11 D.Carmichael, ‘In search of concepts of auditor independence’ (1999) 69 The CPA Journal 40. 
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/1999/0599/features/599p38.html accessed 18 January 2007. 
12 APES110  Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants AUST290.8 (formerly Professional Statement F1 
paragraph 14.) 
13 Ibid. 
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o General conflicts – conflict of interest situations 
o Specific conflicts – proscribed economic, familial, financial or employment
rela
 
tionships between audit client and audit firm 
 
So e A (1) 
in the C
(a)  the individual auditor  engages in an audit activity in relation to an 
audited body at a particular time; and 
at that time; and … 
tor is aware that the conflict of interest situation 
existed at that time; and  
re that the conflict of interest 
 
Section CD t at 
the tim ich  
member of the audit team, to exercise objective and impartial judgment in relation to the 
company and its directors (s324CB) and members of an audit firm (s324CC). 
 
 situations. 
 audit firm 
324CF) or the audit company and its directors (s324CG) are aware that a specific 
ory 
for xample, in the case of an individual auditor, a contravention of section 324C
orporations Act arises if: 
(b)  a conflict of interest situation exists in relation to the audited body 
(c)  the individual audi
(d)  the individual auditor did not as soon as possible after becoming 
aware, take all reasonable steps to ensu
situation ceases to exist.’  
 324 (1) defines a conflict of interest situation as  circumstances that exis
e wh  impair or might impair, the ability of the auditor, or a professional
conduct of an audit.  These terms are very similar to the general statement sand 
pronouncements of the independence as outlined above.  
Any contravention dealing with the general requirements for auditor independence 
could result in criminal offences for individual auditors (s324CA), an audit 
 
In the second subset of conflicts, the legislature has taken the view that regardless of
circumstances, any relationships identified are deemed to conflict of interest
Therefore liability will arise if an individual auditor (s324CE), members of the
(s
relationship has occurred according to Section 324CH. For example, an obvious categ
of lack of independence occurs where the audit client is an officer of the audited body. 
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Therefore the position would enable the officer to influence the audited body in 
connection with its financial reports or the audit. 
 
In the US, audit independence issues have been dealt with by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) rules in 2000. Basically the rules set forth restricti
financial (Rule 210.2-01(c)(1)) employment (Rule
ons on 
 210.2-01(c)(2)) and business 
lationships (Rule 210.2-01(c)(3)) between an auditor and an audit client. The SarbOx 
 as the 
 (FRC) in Australia, that now has oversight over standards (accounting, ethical 
nd auditing) setting in Australia.15 Sitting beneath the FRC are two separately 
                                                
re
Act did not include additional provisions in relation to audit independence issues
rules introduced in 2000 were deemed adequate.14
 
This is the structure of the direct independence reforms. However, CLERP 9 introduced 
other ‘tangential’ reforms as part of the package, and we turn to these indirect effects 
below. 
 
 CLERP 9 has given auditing standards ‘the force of law’: s 307A. At an even more 
abstract level, another part of CLERP 9 has been to establish the Financial Reporting 
Council
a
constituted bodies, the Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (AUASB), and the 
Australian Accounting Standards Board, as illustrated in Figure 2 below. 
 
 
 
14 Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7919.htm  accessed 10 November 2006. 
15 www.frc.gov.au accessed 17 January 2007. The FRC is responsible for providing broad oversight of the 
process for setting accounting and auditing standards as well as monitoring the effectiveness of auditor 
independence requirements in Australia and giving the Minister reports and advice on these matters. 
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Figure 2: FRC and institutional structure 
  
Source www.frc.gov.au
 
Furthermore, during 2006, the accounting and auditing profession voluntarily 
commenced two initiatives designed to strengthen auditor independence measures. 
First, the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board16 was established jointly 
by the accounting and auditing professional bodies, The Institute of Chartered 
Accountants Australia (ICAA) and CPA Australia (CPAA) as an independent body. The 
Board released the former Code of Professional Conduct in the form of a new standard, 
APES110 Code of Ethics for Professional Accountants. This operates as a mandatory 
code of ethics and professional standards by which their members are required to abide 
and similarly, has the force of law. 
Second, the major audit firms17 voluntarily established The Audit Quality Review Board 
(AQRB) in February 2006 by. It is a not-for-profit company that independently reviews 
member firms’ compliance with applicable professional standards and legal obligations 
when conducting audits of listed clients.18
                                                 
16 www.apesb.org.au accessed 17 January 2007. 
17 The initial participating firms are PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and Deloittes. 
18 www.aqrb.org.au accessed 17 January 2007.. 
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Rather than proceeding through a ‘shopping list’ of CLERP 9 measures, we can discern 
some level of expected importance or priority by cross referencing CLERP 9 with these 
parallel initiatives. Auditor are clearly subject to countervailing pressures and are 
exposed to potential threats to independence during and even before accepting an audit 
engagement.19 Therefore governments have introduced regulations to curb these 
countervailing pressures. 
A useful tool provided in APES110 is the ‘threat matrix’, to assist auditors in recognizing 
and building safeguards to threats.20
APES 110.100.10 provides: 
Compliance with the fundamental principles may potentially be threatened by a 
broad range of circumstances. Many threats fall into the following categories: 
(a) Self-interest threats, which may occur as a result of the financial or other 
interests of a Member or of an Immediate or Close Family member; 
(b) Self-review threats, which may occur when a previous judgment needs to be 
reevaluated by the Member responsible for that judgment; 
(c) Advocacy threats, which may occur when a Member promotes a position or 
opinion to the point that subsequent objectivity may be compromised; 
(d) Familiarity threats, which may occur when, because of a close relationship, a 
Member becomes too sympathetic to the interests of others; and 
(e) Intimidation threats, which may occur when a Member may be deterred from 
acting objectively by threats, actual or perceived. 
Rather than tackling head on conflict situations (which we may allocate to the ‘self 
interest’ threat above), other CLERP 9 reforms are useful in addressing these other 
threats to auditor independence, based on experiences commonly perceived by practice. 
Using the threat matrix, CLERP 9 promotes safeguards to the familiarity threat and the 
self review threat by the following measures: 
                                                 
19 K.Houghton and Jubb C, ‘An Australian Response to recent developments in the market for audit 
services’ (2002) 12(2) Australian Accounting Review 24. 
20 The derivation of the threat matrix is discussed in Ramsay, op cit n 1, chapter 4. 
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o Auditor rotation – familiarity threat 
o Auditor recruitment post engagement – familiarity threat 
o Non audit fees – self review threat 
 Accordingly, these three CLERP 9 measures are the subject of investigation and 
comparison in this paper. 
 
3.0 Specific independence threats 
3.1 Auditor rotation – a response to familiarity threat 
Auditors who remain with clients for significant periods may develop inappropriate 
relationship which may compromise independence. The Ramsay Report recommended a 
model of appointment of auditors that has a fixed term, referred to auditor rotation. The 
Ramsay Report reviewed the past work of the Audit Review Working Party21 and 
favoured the proposal to rotate the lead auditor in the team, as opposed to the audit form 
as a whole. This perceived breach of independence is much more apparent to the lead 
engagement22 and review auditors.23 This is because they have the ability to decide the 
work performed by other members of the engagement team and are responsible for the 
type of audit opinion issued.  
Regulatory response 
In response to this long anticipated change, section 324DA Corporations Act states that 
individuals who play a significant role in the audit24 of a listed company for five 
successive years are ineligible to do so again. There is a waiting period of a further 2 
years. Section 324DA is also a strict liability section, which means contravention is a 
criminal offence.  
                                                 
21 MINCO, op cit n 7, recommendation 7.7. 
22 Under Section 324AF, a ‘lead auditor’ is the registered company auditor who is primary responsible to 
the audit firm or audit company that is conducting the audit. 
23 Under Section 324AF, a ‘review auditor’ is the registered company auditor (if any) who is primary 
responsible to the individual auditor, the audit firm, or audit company for reviewing the conduct of the 
audit. 
24 The term ‘play a significant role’ in the audit is defined in s 9 and essentially means the lead auditor and 
the review auditor. 
 11
Similarly, in the US, s 203 SarbOx Act requires rotation by the lead auditor and 
reviewing auditor after 5 years. However, there is no explicit ‘down time’ specified in the 
s 203 prohibition. 
Alternatives 
The CLERP 9 report suggests that there was “broad support” among stakeholders for this 
recommendation.25 Given that it had been suggested since the 1997 working party, then 
the market has been expecting it.  
The Ramsay Report and CLERP 9 have baulked at rotating the audit firms, even though 
this measure would increase the public perception of auditor independence. Those who 
support the rotation of audit firms also believe that audit quality would increase. This is 
because audit firms know that their work will be reviewed by another audit firm in the 
near future. Therefore, they would carry out their audit procedures better more diligently. 
The arguments in favour of audit firm rotation are canvassed in more detail in Raiborn et 
al26 as below. 
o Decreases the development of ‘coziness’ between audit firm and client 
o Decreases the potential for auditors to succumb to management pressure 
o Increases public perception of auditor independence 
o Increases the potential for auditors to be more vocal in disagreeing with 
management 
o Potentially increases the supply of audit firms in niche sectors 
o Increases the level of competition among audit forms for clients 
o Increase audit quality by providing a ‘fresh look’. 
                                                 
25 Corporate Disclosure:  Strengthening the financial reporting framework (2002) Commonwealth of 
Australia, 83. 
26 C.Raiborn, C Schorg, M Massoud, ‘Should Auditor Rotation be Mandatory?’ (2006) 17(4) The Journal 
of Corporate Accounting & Finance 37 at 40. 
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The Securities and Exchange Commission has addressed the criticism of the five year 
period, as it can be seen as potentially arbitrary.  Rather than restricting lead and 
reviewing auditors, is it appropriate to also extend a different rotation period to other 
personnel in the audit team? Given that the current restriction on lead and review auditors 
is five years, some have suggested that other auditors be given a longer restriction. Such 
restriction would allow audit firms to establish appropriate transition plans from one lead 
or concurring auditor to the next. The longer rotation period for the other auditors would 
allow them to spend time on the engagement team to learn about the business and the 
industry before taking on the ultimate responsibility for the engagement.27
Although clearly the lead and the review auditor perform critical functions that affect the 
conduct and effectiveness of the engagement, however, in many larger engagements, the 
engagement team will include more than just the lead and review auditor. Therefore those 
other auditors on the engagement team who play a significant role in the conduct of the 
audit and maintaining ongoing relationships with the audit client should be restricted as 
well.28
Others have argued that mandatory auditor rotation incur additional costs and would 
result in a loss of knowledge as well. It is argued that the costs involved are far greater 
than the perceived improvement in audit independence. 29
When auditors are rotated they will be new to the client and to the business environment 
the client is operating in. This inadequate knowledge can lead to severe consequences as 
                                                 
27 Securities and Exchange Commission, Final Rule: Revision of the Commission’s Auditor Independence 
Requirements, 27/3/2003   http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm accessed 17 January 2007. 
28 Securities and Exchange Commission, ibid. 
29 M.Sinnett, ‘Are There Good Reasons For Auditor Rotation?’ Financial Executive, 1 October 2004, 29. 
 13
it has been reported that audit failures are three times more likely to occur if the auditing 
firm is conducting its first or second audit of the company.30
Others have concerns when the rotation requirements are applied to smaller audit firms. 
This is because most small audit firms usually do not have many lead and review 
auditors. Therefore these firms would be unable to provide audit services to their public 
clients for the long term. Many have argued that this would result in those clients 
incurring greater costs such as from having to identify a new accounting firm, from the 
need to familiarize accountants with the client firm's industry and business practices and 
from the resulting reduction in competition among firms.31  
Conclusion 
Although there has been some controversy attached to the lead auditor versus audit firm 
rotation debate, the Australian response is similar to SarbOx. If there is an argument of 
relative ‘stringency’, we have noted that a lead auditor becomes eligible for re-
appointment after a two year ‘down time’. 
3.2 Auditor recruitment post engagement – familiarity threat 
 
Key audit personnel that have been directly involved with the audit of a client get to 
know the corporate officials on a fairly personal basis. This relationship would develop 
over the course of several years. As a result, when the client does have to fill a key 
financial position, the auditor would certainly be a key candidate as they are familiar with 
the corporation’s financial activities and they would have the relevant experience and 
                                                 
30 G.Nashwa, ‘Auditor Rotation and the Quality of Audits’ (2004) 74(12) The CPA Journal 22. 
31 Gavin Clancy, ‘CLERP 9 reforms may limit talent pool for company directors’ (2003) 
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/press_release/0,1014,sid%253D5625%2526cid%253D26536,00.html accessed 
17 January 2007. 
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expertise for the job.32 Therefore such an employment raises issues with respect to 
independence. From the outset, doubts arise regarding the remaining auditors ability to be 
independent when dealing with the ex-colleague, given that the ex-colleague was 
generally of a higher position in the audit team than the remaining auditors.33 Also 
questions have to be raised on the insider knowledge that the former auditor will have on 
the practices of the audit firm.34 Such insider knowledge can have undesirable 
consequences, as evidenced in the HealthSouth Corporation collapse (discussed below).35
Given that there is support for the notion that audit independence is undermined as a 
result of ex-auditors employed by clients, changes have been made in both legislation to 
reflect the need to provide some sort of restriction on former auditors and their client.   
SarbOx Act Response 
Section 206 of the SarbOx states: 
‘It shall be unlawful fort a registered public accounting firm to 
perform for an issuer any audit services required by this title if a 
chief executive officer, controller, chief financial officer, or any 
person serving in an equal position for the issuer, was employed by 
that registered independent public accounting firm and participated 
in any capacity in the audit of the issuer during the 1-year period 
preceding the date of the initiation of the audit.’ 
 
Thus, the Act requires a cooling-off period of one year before a member of the audit 
engagement team can begin working for the registrant in certain key positions 
                                                 
32 R.Kaplan, ‘The Mother of All Conflicts: Auditors and Their Clients’ (2004) The Journal of Corporation 
Law 370. 
33 M.Beasley, Carcello J and Hermanson D, ‘Should you offer a job to your external auditor?’ (2000) 11(4) 
Journal of Corporate Accounting & Finance 37. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Carrick Mollenkamp HealthSouth Accounting Woes Grow to as Much as $4.6 Billion, Wall Street 
Journal, 21 January 2004, B2. 
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CLERP 9 Changes 
Under the Act, a person is prohibited from becoming an officer of an audited body for 
two years36 if the person either ceases to be a member of an audit firm or director of an 
audit company and was a professional member of the audit team37 engaged in an audit of 
the audited body (Section 324CI) or ceases to be a professional employee38 of the auditor 
if the person was a lead auditor or review auditor for an audit of the audited body 
(Section 324 CJ). 
Criticism 
In comparison, while the SarbOx Act requires a cooling off period of one year before a 
member of the audit engagement team can begin working for the audit client in certain 
key positions, CLERP 9 has implemented a mandatory two-year cooling-off period. 
While some have argued that the one year period in the US is insufficient, others have 
argued that the two year prohibition is too harsh. CLERP 9 imposes more strict 
requirements in relation to auditor rotation, claiming that a restriction of less than two 
years is insufficient.39  
 
Some have argued that the cooling off period in the US of one year is insufficient as an 
audit partner, who could have easily audited the firm for more than ten years in different 
positions, once gets rotated off the job once for a year duration can then be allowed to 
                                                 
36 It was four years under the original recommendation by the HIH Royal Commissioner. Due to the 
overwhelming opposition to this proposal, the Act has implemented a mandatory two-year cooling-off 
period. 
37 Section 324CE defines ‘professional members of the audit team’ as any registered company auditor who 
participates in the conduct of the audit, any other person who in the course of doing so exercise 
professional judgment regarding the application of or compliance with accounting or auditing standards and 
legal requirements, and any other person who is in a position to directly influence the audit outcome. 
38 Section 9 defines a ‘professional employee’ of an auditor is someone who participates in the conduct of 
audits and in the course of doing so exercises professional judgment regarding the application or 
compliance with accounting or auditing standards or legal requirements. 
39 J. McConvill, An Introduction to CLERP 9 (2004) at 59. 
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join the corporation.40 In the scandal of HealthSouth Corporation,41 profits were 
overstated by $4.6 billion over several years. The company auditor Ernst & Young was 
unable to detect the errors as not only the company spread the misstatements across 
several accounts, company officials also ensured that these illegal transactions did not 
exceed the dollar threshold that Ernst & young used to check year-to-year variations. It 
was revealed that the chief financial officer used to work in Ernst & Young in the 1980s. 
In this context, the current restriction of one year would have had no impact as it would 
not have prevented the same chief financial officer from getting appointed even today. 
The implemented CLERP 9 reforms may pose some real difficulty for smaller listed 
companies as many of these smaller listed companies welcome the input of members 
from their former audit teams because of the expertise and knowledge they bring with 
them. 
3.3 Non- Audit fees–a threat to audit independence?  
Section 2 provides the definitions in SarbOx Act. It states that non-audit services means 
any professional services provided to an issuer by a registered public accounting firm, 
other than those provided to an issuer in connection with an audit or a review of the 
financial statements of an issuer. In comparison, there is no definition in the 
Corporations Act in Australia. However, non-audit services are generally regarded to 
cover all services not coming within the scope of the audit contract that an audit firm 
provides to an audit client.42
 
                                                 
40 Kaplan, op cit n 32. 
41 Carrick Mollenkamp, op cit n 35. 
42 Ramsay  n 1. 
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Price competition since the mid 1970s has resulted in a reduction in profit margins in 
external audit. This caused the provision of audit services to become less appealing.43 
This in turn has given rise to a rapid expansion of the provision of non-audit services. 
However, the provision of non-audit services is a threat to the perceived independence of 
auditors. While some argue that the provision of both non-audit and audit services by the 
external auditor raises huge doubts regarding the independence of auditors44 others do 
not think likewise.45  
Empirical Evidence 
The extent of the threat to independence posed by the provision of non-audit services has 
long been a fascinating question. In Australia, Craswell designed a study, using empirical 
techniques on audit fees, to conclude that provision of non-audit services may not pose a 
threat to auditor independence.46 The provision of both non-audit services and audit 
services can provide certain efficiencies as the client is a known entity.47 Also, the 
provision of non-audit services by the audit firm may increase the amount of information 
given to the auditor and hence would issue an audit report of higher quality.48 Clients 
may also purchase non-audit services from the audit firm so as to lower costs or to 
improve the reporting of financial statements.49 Also, the specialization of either non-
                                                 
43 C.Hayes, ‘The Ramsay Report and the Regulation of Auditor Independence in Australia’,(2002) 12(2) 
Australian Accounting Review, 5. 
44 The HIH Royal Commission, ‘The failure of HIH Insurance’ (2003) Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra; see also Houghton and Jubb, n 19; Kaplan, op cit n 32 . 
45 H.Ashbaugh, LaFond R, and Mayhew B, ‘Do Non-audit Services Compromise Auditor Independence? 
Further Evidence’ (2003) 78(3) The Accounting Review 625; see also W. Kinney, Palmrose Z, and Scholz 
S, ‘Auditor Independence, Non-audit services, and restatements: Was the U.S. Government right?’(2003) 
42(3) Journal of Accounting Research 573. 
46 A.Craswell, ‘Does the Provision of Non-Audit Services Impair Auditor Independence?’(1999) 29(3) 
International Journal of Auditing, using a logit model to test Australian data for 1984, 1987 and 1994. 
47 Houghton  and Jubb, op cit n 19. 
48 D.Simunic, ‘Auditing, Consulting and Auditor Independence’ (1984) 22(2) Journal of Accounting 
Research 700. 
49 Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz, op cit n 45. 
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audit or audit services in large firms could make it uneconomical for them to retain 
crucial expertise,50 or not.51  
 
Critics argue that large fees, especially those that relate to non-audit services, may make 
auditors more dependent on the client.52 This is because the more financial remuneration 
an auditor receives, the more influence that client potentially could exert over the 
auditor. Indeed, fees from non-audit services can be far more material than those from 
audit services. This is demonstrated in recent studies as they reveal that firms have paid 
far more to their audit firms for non-audit services than previously estimated. For 
example, in 2001, Sprint Corporation spent $2.3 million on audit fees and $64 million on 
non-audit services.53 Audit independence could be impaired as the audit firm may not be 
willing to criticize work performed in its consultancy department so that non-audit 
services can be continued.54 Auditors who receive non-audit fees are less likely to 
qualify their opinion than auditors who don’t receive such fees.55 It is perceived that 
firms that appoint two separate audit firms to perform audit and non-audit services are 
more independent than firms who appoint the same audit firm to perform both services.56  
 
                                                 
50 Houghton  and Jubb, op cit n 19. 
51 L.Ribstein, Corman R, and Corman M, ‘Market vs Regulatory Response to Corporate Fraud: A Critique 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’ (2002) Working Paper, University of Illinois College of Law. 
52 C.Becker C, DeFond M, Jiambalv, J, and Subramanyam K, ‘The Effect of Audit Quality on Earnings 
Management’ (1998) 15(1) Contemporary Accounting Research 23. 
53 Judith Burns,  ‘Proxy Reports Show Firms Pay Hefty Non-Audit Fees’, Dow Jones Newswire, 12 April 
2001, 06:48.   
54 S.Chai and Jubb C, ‘Audit and Non-Audit Service Provision: Earnings Management and Audit Opinion 
Implications’ (2000) Research Paper University of Melbourne. 
55 G. Wines, ‘Auditor Independence, Audit Qualifications and the Provision of Non-Audit Services: 
A Note’ (1994) Accounting and Finance 75-76. 
56 S.Swanger, and Chewing E, ‘The Effect of Internal Audit Outsourcing on Financial Analysts’ 
Perceptions of External Auditor Independence’ (2001) 20(2) Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 
121. 
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 Despite previous studies that offer no obvious answer whether the provision of non-
audit services do affect audit independence, regulators seem to believe that it will.  
 
Previous empirical literature suggests that size of audit fees is a function of various 
factors including client-specific factors (such as size, risk and complexity) and auditor 
specific factors, notable auditor quality (measured by big 4 or non big 4).57 With the new 
laws relating to auditor independence and disclosure of non-audit fees, it is interesting to 
speculate whether these changes will have an effect on audit fees – and the relative 
magnitude of non-audit fees. 
 
In an effort to provide some indication of the trend in Australia, Table 1 below shows 
data collected on the fees audit firms received for audit and non-audit services over a six 
year period – 2000 – 2001.58 This six year period was selected to accommodate pre-
CLERP 9 and moving through the announced changes and the actual changes. Whilst not 
providing empirical evidence to support a conclusion, the descriptive information 
provides the following insights: 
o The audit fees for the sample firms have been increasing over the six year period 
o Non-audit fees have been declining since 2001. 
o For total fees, the mean total fees have been increasing, suggesting that the 
amount paid for audit fees has increased dramatically in relative terms. 
                                                 
57 A.Craswell, Francis J and Taylor, S, ‘Auditor brand name reputations and industry specialisations’ 
(1995) 20 Journal of Accounting and Economics 297. 
58  The data was collected from a randomly selected sample of 50 listed firms from a range of industries (no 
banks), that had not received a qualified opinion over the six year period. 
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These aggregate statistics provide some interesting points for researchers to investigate 
possible causes of fee increase over the last six years. As lawyers, it is compelling to 
believe that there may be some CLERP 9 effects in those increases. 
 Table 1 
  Audit Fees 2000 Audit Fees 2001 Audit Fees 2002 Audit Fees 2003 Audit Fees 2004 Audit Fees 2005 
Mean  300462 394731 472022 472495 599160 670070 
Median 113500 139075 146325 157875 204760 236600 
Maximum 3898000 5478000 8045000 6285000 6460000 8460000 
Minimum 13500 16000 21720 16287 25500 22180 
% of total fees 0.5 0.48 0.56 0.62 0.7 0.73 
  Non Audit Fees 2000 Non Audit Fees 2001 Non Audit Fees 2002 
Non Audit Fees 
2003 
Non Audit Fees 
2004 
Non Audit Fees 
2005 
Mean  304778 421506 365606 285020 261526 248333 
Median 42232 64134 55914 102692 107274 88729 
Maximum 4249000 8468000 5750000 3778000 1909700 1600464 
Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 
% in relation to 
total fees 0.5 0.52 0.44 0.38 0.3 0.27 
  Total Fees  2000 Total Fees 2001 Total Fees  2002 Total Fees 2003 Total Fees  2004 Total Fees  2005 
Mean  605239 816237 837627 757515 860686 918403 
Median 174499 180016 188415 268475 326817 349894 
Maximum 8147000 13946000 13795000 7096000 6846000 8659000 
Minimum 13501 19500 22001 19027 27256 22180 
Response by the SarbOx Act 
The response of the SarbOx Act to the problem posed by non-audit services is two-fold. 
While specific non-audit services are banned (Section 201(g)), others are permitted only 
if they are pre-approved by their own audit committee (Section 201(h)).  
 
The SarbOx Act Section 201(g) prohibits an auditing firm from providing eight 
categories of non-audit services to existing audit clients.  
It states: 
Except as provided in subsection (h), it shall be unlawful for a registered 
public accounting firm (and any associated person of that firm, to the extent 
determined appropriate by the Commission) that performs for any issuer any 
audit required by this title or the rules of the Commission under this title or, 
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beginning 180 days after the date of commencement of the operations of the 
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board established under section 101 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (in this section referred to as the 
‘Board’), the rules of the Board, to provide to that issuer, 
contemporaneously with the audit, any non-audit service, including— 
(1) bookkeeping or other services related to the accounting records 
or financial statements of the audit client; 
(2) financial information systems design and implementation; 
(3) appraisal or valuation services, fairness opinions, or contribution-
in-kind reports; 
(4) actuarial services; 
(5) internal audit outsourcing services; 
(6) management functions or human resources; 
(7) broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking 
services; 
(8) legal services and expert services unrelated to the audit; and 
(9) any other service that the Board determines, by regulation, is 
impermissible. 
In addition, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) is allowed to 
include any services to be added to the list. The PCAOB may also exempt any particular 
accounting firm on a case by case basis from this statutory prohibition. All in all, 
accounting firms are still allowed to provide any non-audit services to all firms that are 
not their existing audit clients, but are prohibited to provide the eight categories of non-
audit services to their existing audit clients. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rules also require disclosure of fees 
billed for non-audit services. 
 
CLERP 9 Response 
Unlike the SarbOx Act, CLERP 9 does not ban specific non-audit services. It requires 
relevant non-audit services has to be identified and the director has to declare that it has 
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not compromised audit independence. These are incorporated in section 300 (11B) which 
states: 
‘The report for a listed company must also include the following in 
relation to each auditor. 
(a) details of the amounts paid or payable to the auditor for non-audit 
services provided during the year by the auditor;  
(b) a statement whether the directors are satisfied that the provision of 
non-audit services during the year by the auditor is compatible 
with the general standard of independence for auditors imposed by 
this Act;  
(c) a statement of the directors’ reasons for being satisfied that the 
provision of those non-audit services during the year by the auditor 
did not compromise the auditor independence requirements of this 
Act.’ 
 
Section 307C also requires the auditor or the lead auditor to provide a 
written declaration that they have complied with the independence 
requirements of the Corporations Act.  
Conclusion 
Despite inconclusive empirical evidence that the provision of non-audit services 
actually breach audit independence, both the CLERP 9 and the SarbOx Act has 
imposed restriction in the provision of non-audit services. As SarbOx Act is 
prescriptive in specifically prohibits the types of non-audit services that auditors can 
provide to their audit clients, it would be argued that the Australian position is less 
stringent.
4.0 Concluding Remarks 
4.1 Summary 
This paper has shown that audit independence is crucial in ensuring that the audit process 
is credible. This is recognized by the implementation of parallel regulations in both 
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Australia and US. We have identified the three main areas (auditor rotation, employment 
relationship with former auditor, and client and non-audit services provided by the 
auditor) where the regulations have focused on specific breaches of independence. This is 
addition to the general discussion on the direct independence reforms, that prohibit 
certain conflict of interest situations and relationships. 
4.2 Similarities and difference of the two Acts in relation to audit 
independence 
If we were to identify our four areas of examination – audit independence & 
relationships, auditor rotation, former auditor recruitment and provision of non-audit 
services – as a sliding scale of stringency, we could assess these on a scale of similar 
levels of impost, demonstrating less stringency.  
 
As identified earlier, the two areas in which the regulation have adopted the same 
approach is audit independence and auditor rotation, although auditor rotation in 
Australia has a leniency with a built in re-eligibility clause, but balanced with this has 
strict liability for non-compliance. In relation to recruitment of former auditor by clients, 
CLERP 9 imposes stricter enforcements than the US. In relation to non-audit services, it 
is believed that the SOX Act imposes stricter enforcements than CLERP 9, as the latter 
favours a disclosure approach, not a prescriptive approach. These differences effectively 
boil down to two main reasons. 
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1 The recommendations made as a result of the corporate collapses 
enquiry 
The US Senate Commerce Committee 2002 and HIH Royal Commission Report 2003 
were established to investigate the reasons behind the corporate collapses. In the HIH 
Royal Commission Report, it was identified that three former partners of Andersen were 
appointed to the board of HIH, namely Cohen, Fodera and Gardener. Gardener was 
appointed as the chair of chairman of the audit committee 17 months after his retirement 
from Andersen. Fodera joined HIH as the chief financial officer (CFO) the day after he 
resigned from Andersen, where he had been the engagement partner on the HIH audit. 
Cohen was appointed to the board of HIH approximately five months after his retirement 
from Andersen, where he had played a significant role in the audit of HIH for twenty-five 
years.59 Given the magnitude of the employment relationships that existed between 
former Andersen auditors and HIH leading up to the collapse of the insurance company, 
it is expected that CLERP 9 would impose tougher restrictions. The HIH Royal 
Commissioner argues that any duration shorter than two years ‘might not be sufficient to 
arrest a reasonable apprehension that former partners retain an influence over members of 
the audit team.’ 60
2 The adverse impact it might have on firms 
While the banning of certain services provided by auditors would impact both US and 
Australia in a similar fashion, there is a recognition that the economic impact may be 
greater - professional firms in this country are generally regarded to be smaller in size 
and volume as well. First, as identified in the US, the new legislation has resulted in 
                                                 
59 HIH Royal Commission Report Chapter 21.4.3 
http://www.hihroyalcom.gov.au/finalreport/Chapter%2021   accessed 10 December 2006. 
60 James McConvill, n39.. 
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separate incorporate entities for non-audit services. As a result of the separation, non-
audit and audit fees are bound to increase as costs cannot be spread across business lines. 
Audit fees in particular, have already been expected to increase because of other changes 
made by CLERP 9 and the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS).61 As the 
audit is mandatory and costs have increased, we may expect discretionary spending on 
other professional services to decline. For example, firms that need to improve on their 
controls may not decide to do so because of the huge increase in audit fees.62  
 
Next the demand for non-audit services will decline. If the demand drops rapidly, 
consulting firms maybe forced to shut down. This can result in undesirable consequences.  
While these arguments can be put forward in the US as well, because firms are generally 
much smaller in Australia when compared to the US, the consequences can be felt much 
more in Australia.63
 
4.3 Findings 
Overall, without looking at the detail, it is difficult to sustain generalities such that 
SarbOx is more stringent in auditor independence that CLERP 9. each jurisdiction was 
responding to similar, yet subtly different audit and corporate governance environments. 
Whilst empirical questions measuring the ‘value’ or cost of regulation are an exciting 
                                                 
61 Australian disclosing entities are required to comply with Australian equivalents to IFRS for financial 
years ending on or after 1 January 2005. They will change existing accounting standards in relation to the 
recognition and measurement of assets, liabilities, equity, revenue and expenses. These changes could 
allow investors to make informed decisions across different jurisdiction.  However, this also means that 
there will be drastic changes to the financial reports of a company after 1 January 2005. 
62 Ramsay , op cit n 1. 
63 Some of these arguments or scenarios are discussed in the Ramsay report, op cit n 1. 
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development, it is important that researchers understand the degree to which findings can 
‘translate’ across jurisdictions. 
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